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Language Modularity
Lindsay N. Harris and Iwona Lech
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, USA

Synonyms
Domain speciﬁcity; Functional specialization

Psychology (Fodor 1983) electriﬁed the stillyoung ﬁeld of cognitive psychology. Fodor’s
modularity, which depicts modules as hardwired
information processing systems, appealed to a
generation of psychologists who were intent on
peering into the behaviorists’ “black box” of the
mind and were hungry for technical language to
describe what they had begun to ﬁnd there. The
theory’s impact on the cognitive and language
sciences has been broad, deep, and enduring.

Definition
Fodor’s Modularity of Mind
The notion that human cognitive architecture
includes a module for language, i.e., an innate
system of neural tissue that responds only to
speech.

Introduction
The concept of a modularized mind, constructed
of distinct units devoted to particular psychological functions, can be traced back at least to Gall,
the father of the nineteenth-century phrenology. In
the twentieth century, a version of modularity
(termed “the new organology” by detractors)
was advocated by Chomsky, who speculated that
some sort of language module would be necessary
to support his universal grammar (e.g., Chomsky
1980). Today modularity is most closely identiﬁed with Jerry Fodor, whose publication in 1983
of The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty

The idea of a modular mind emerged from
Fodor’s philosophical view of the brain as a computer. Fodor argues that innate cognitive modules,
or “input systems,” are necessary to interpret
information encountered “at the surfaces (as it
were) of the organism” (Fodor 1983, p. 42) such
that it is comprehensible by the “central systems”
of the brain, where conscious, higher-order cognitive processes occur. Although he sidesteps providing a detailed list of candidate modules, Fodor
does grant that there are likely to be modules for at
least “the perceptual systems plus language”
(emphasis original; Fodor 1983, p. 44). He argues
that a module for language interpretation is as
valuable to humanity as a module for perception
of light or odor on the grounds that all of these
hypothesized input systems serve the function of
generating hypotheses about “the way that the
world is” (p. 45) for use by higher-order cognitive
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systems. Processing the speech of others, Fodor
points out, is a generally reliable way of obtaining
information about the world – “In the root case,
the convention is that we say of x that it is F only if
x is F ” (p. 45) – and thus a module for speech
processing is adaptive.
In Modularity of Mind, Fodor provides nine
criteria that he concludes are useful in identifying
a module, two of which have received outsized
attention by both supporters and critics of his
thesis: domain speciﬁcity and informational
encapsulation. Modules are domain speciﬁc in
that they respond only to a particular stimulus
domain, for example, the purported language
module responds to speech, but not to nonspeech
auditory stimuli. Modules are informationally
encapsulated in that they are autonomous, i.e.,
they do not interact with central systems or with
each other. The primary implication of encapsulation for the language module is that prior knowledge or beliefs – that is, top-down information
ﬂow – will not interfere with speech perception.
Fodor dismisses evidence of top-down inﬂuences
on language comprehension, such as the ability to
understand acoustically degraded speech, or the
phoneme-restoration effect, as post-perceptual
(in the case of the former) or as intramodular
ﬂow (in the case of the latter).
The modularity thesis has become unfashionable among cognitive psychologists in recent
years (“I am well aware of efforts to debunk this
view, the arguments raised toward that end, and
the disfavor into which a modular view of the
mind has fallen,” comments Curtiss (2013,
p. 90) in a recent defense of modularity), for a
number of reasons. For one, the double dissociations between language skill and general cognitive abilities in lesion patients and individuals
with genetic syndromes that are predicted by a
language module segregated from other neural
tissue have proved elusive (e.g., Stojanovik
2014; although see Barrett and Kurzban 2006,
for an account of the unlikelihood of ﬁnding perfect dissociations even in a completely modular
system). Additionally, advances in neuroimaging
in the past 20 years have failed to reveal spatially
or connectively “encapsulated” tissue for language or, for that matter, anything else.
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Finally, the concept of “computer” has
changed considerably since the publication of
Modularity of Mind. In the past 30 years, connectionist networks that reliably simulate many
aspects of cognition by exploiting parallel distributed processing and spreading activation of information have largely eclipsed the serial, symbolreading devices on which Fodor modeled his view
of the mind. If alternative models of the computer
had been available in the 1970s and early 1980s,
Fodor could have perhaps conceived of a different
architecture of the mind that is nonetheless computational (cf. Katz 2014).

Reconceptualizing Modularity
However, the modularity thesis might remain viable if one is willing to accept a looser deﬁnition of
a module. The encapsulation requirement now
seems fairly untenable, but the same is not necessarily true of the domain-speciﬁcity requirement.
It is well established that there are certain areas of
the brain, and networks of these areas, that are
reliably involved in language processing (e.g.,
Fedorenko 2014). Thus, cognitive psychologists
and neuroscientists almost universally allow that
there is functional specialization for language.
(The terms “domain speciﬁc” and “functionally
specialized” are used interchangeably here,
although others have differentiated them.)
Of those who are willing to declare the language network a module, its provenance is still a
matter of serious contention. A spectrum of thinking on the matter stretches from strong nativism
on one end to complete emgergentism on the
other. Nativists such as Curtiss, whose doctoral
dissertation examined the famed case of Genie,
point to differential activation patterns in response
to speech versus other acoustic stimuli in the
brains of infants as evidence that neural speech
systems are hardwired (Curtiss 2013).
Emergentists, meanwhile, are highly dismissive
of the notion that a “blueprint” of the mental
structures that will develop in an individual is
genetically
programmed.
Karmiloff-Smith
(1992) argues that modules are formed wholly
through interactions with the environment, and
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Barrett and Kurzban (2006) provide an evolutionary mechanism for their emergence: natural selection has provided humans with genes that allow
the brain to functionally specialize in response to
stimuli and environments that have been reliably
encountered across human history. It follows that
“if the normal environment of development is
changed, developmental outcomes might be different” (Barrett and Kurzban 2006, p. 638).
Thus, for the nativist, Genie’s brain was denied
the linguistic input required at the right moment in
development to rouse its innate language module;
for the emergentist, because Genie was denied
linguistic input at the right moment in development, the gene-by-environment calculus that
causes the language module to emerge under normal circumstances was disrupted, and no such
module ever formed. Yet another view departs
from the nativist-emergentist spectrum altogether,
and has languages evolving to ﬁt brains, rather
than the other way around (Christiansen and
Chater 2008). This view puts any biological adaptation for language as recent, minimal, and falling
far short of anything that could be considered a
module, even in a relaxed sense of the term.

Conclusion
Despite the increasing skepticism with which the
modularity thesis has been viewed in certain academic circles in the past two decades, it is by no
means obsolete. It is a touchstone for many evolutionary psychologists, who feel that Fodor was
in fact too conservative when he denied modularity to the central systems of the brain. They posit
instead that the brain is massively modular,
because a large number of functionally specialized cognitive systems should be more ﬂexible in
the face of a changing environment than a small
number of functionally general systems (e.g.,
Tooby and Cosmides 1992; Barrett and Kurzban
2006).
When Modularity of Mind was ﬁrst published,
one might have assumed that the invention of a
noninvasive technology for watching a brain in
action would go a long way toward settling the
question of the validity of Fodor’s theory. Today,
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nearly 25 years after functional magnetic resonance imaging was ﬁrst used to watch human
brains at work, the debate is far from settled.
Modern conceptualizations of modularity are
strongly altered from the one Fodor proposed,
but the usefulness of the construct for framing
central questions in the study of human cognition
has ensured its survival to the present day.

Cross-References
▶ Evidence of Brain Modularity
▶ Language Preadaptations
▶ Linguistic Evolution
▶ Nativism
▶ Neurobiology of Language
▶ Universal Grammar
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